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BOOK REVIEW

THE THEORY AND CRAFT OF AMERICAN LAW-ELEMENTS.

By Soia Mentschikoff* and Irwin P. Stotzky.**
New York: Mathew Bender. 1981. Pp. xxxv, 827, 37, 40. $29.50.
Reviewed by William C. Jones***
No pedagogical technique is more familiar to the American
public than the case method of law study. Certainly, no other has
been the subject of a movie and a television series. Yet few viewers
of The Paper Chase can appreciate what Professor Kingsfield was
trying to accomplish. The study of law by the case method is difficult to describe; it must be experienced. This experience is the basis of the program of instruction in American law schools. The case
method instills analytic skills and problem-solving techniques. It
trains students to "think like lawyers" or simply to "think." In the
process, students learn some rules of law, but the mental agility
they are acquiring is more fundamental to the process of legal
education.
The modern use of the case method differs from that
envisioned by its originator, Christopher C. Langdell. Langdell believed
that students would uncover the principles of law by-analyzing
their source-the cases.' Most first-year teachers probably share
his view to some extent. Most torts teachers, for example, believe
that students should learn something about negligence, defamation, and manufacturer's liability in addition to legal analysis. Certainly, the students think that this is what they are learning. Second-year teachers assume that their students have a certain
quantum of knowledge about torts and contracts. Bar examiners
test this assumption. Nevertheless, most legal educators strive to
teach their students to think and analyze; in the minds of many
law teachers, the rules are subordinate to the analysis.
* Distinguished
** Professor of

Professor Emeritus, University of Miami School of Law.
Law, University of Miami School of Law.
* Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.

1. See W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN

AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT

10-12 (1973).
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If thinking and analysis constitute the primary objective of legal education, then educators should inform their students of this
objective. Professor Karl Llewellyn thought a course specifically
devoted to method would benefit first-year law students. Professor
Llewellyn first applied his idea by giving a series of introductory
lectures at Columbia University in the late 1920's. These lectures
were later published in a book entitled The Bramble Bush. When
Llewellyn went to the University of Chicago in the 1950's, he began teaching a course for first-year students called Elements of the
Law. Dean Levi had been teaching a similarly named course at
Chicago, but Llewellyn's course differed markedly in both method
and purpose. Soia Mentschikoff, Llewellyn's wife and colleague,
continued to teach this course at Chicago after Professor Llewellyn
died. She introduced the course to the University of Miami School
of Law when she became its Dean in 1974. Dean Mentschikoff formerly taught, and Professor Irwin Stotzky and other faculty members now teach, an expanded version of Llewellyn's Elements
course to all first-year students.
The casebook that Dean Mentschikoff and Professor Stotzky
created for Miami's Elements course, The Theory and Craft of
American Law,' is an outgrowth of the materials that Llewellyn
originally compiled. The authors intend the casebook to be used in
conjunction with The Bramble Bush and Edward H. Levi's An Introduction to Legal Reasoning."
Because of its authorship and provenance, American Law is
an important casebook for a course in Elements or Legal Process.
For the same reasons, it is also an important statement about
American legal education and American law. I will discuss these
two aspects of the book: the book as the basis of a first-year course,
and its significance for American law.
American Law is a unique first-year casebook. It consists of
four parts, each centered around a group of related cases. Part I
contains a 300-page introduction to the study of law, which alone
could serve as the basis of a course. It concentrates on remedies
and asks in a variety of contexts the Mr. Dooley question, "Do I
get me money or property returned to me?" Part I begins the student's analytic training by including instructions on briefing cases
(pp. xxviii-xxxv), and then introduces the student to some forms of
2. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (reprint 1950).
3. S. MENTSCHIKOFF & I. STOTZKY, THE THEORY AND CRAFT
4. E. LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948).

OF AMERICAN LAW

(1981).

1983]

BOOK REVIEW

action (pp. 24-36, 61-65), remedies (pp. 175-229), and justiciability
(pp. 231-61). Each case is followed by intensive questioning on the
holding and its relationship to those of other cases.
The remaining three parts of the book consist of three sequences of cases, primarily from New York. Part II concerns a narrow problem with which the students may already be familiar-indefiniteness in contracts (pp. 295-554). By presenting a
series of New York cases, with later cases being based on earlier
ones, the authors demonstrate how case law develops. A series of
questions follows each case to encourage the student to make an
intensive analysis. A particularly interesting feature is the constant
reference to the attorney's role.' The authors ask: What did X do
wrong, how should he have argued his case, and how did this relate
to the court's opinion?7 There is also reference to the social context within which the cases were decided8 and to the style in which
the judges wrote their opinions.e This sequence ends with cases
from a court of which Cardozo was a member, providing the student an opportunity to observe how a great judge functions both as
an opinion writer and an influence on the court. Part II also includes the provisions on indefiniteness in contracts from Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code (pp. 519-23). This shows the students the relationship between the U.C.C. and the case law it has
5. See, for example, the treatment of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(1854) (pp. 103-06). The Notes and Questions section begins with a direct question about
the opinion, interjects the actual instruction by the assize judge, continues with some suggested arguments, quotes lengthy passages by two text writers, assigns the task of drafting a
new charge on the new trial, and concludes by asking whether the pleadings could have been
framed in tort.
6. The authors include attorneys' arguments for each case.
7. The notes following United Press v. New York Press Co., 164 N.Y. 406, 58 N.E. 527
(1900) (pp. 341-44), provide a detailed discussion of what counsel for the appellant might
have done. The student is asked: "[H]ow would you have argued the cause for plaintiff in
United Press? Phrase your argument exactly and in writing. (You must, of course, critique
[the attorney's] argument When shaping your own" (p. 343). The authors then change the
case by using hypotheticals, requiring the student to rethink his previous analysis. The
notes conclude with similar analytical questions directed to the respondent's argument.
8. An example of this is in the authors' discussion of requirement contracts (pp. 47980). Questions asking why a six-cent damage case is twice appealed (p. 72), and why banks
are worried about a particular decision (p. 807), also force the student to consider the social
framework within which the cases were decided.
9. At the beginning of the sequence there is a lengthy quotation from K. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION

(1960) (pp. 318-21). Llewellyn detected two predominant

styles of opinion writing. The first was the Grand Style, in which the judge clearly indicates
that he is deciding on the basis of precedent, principle, and policy in an effort to find the
best rule, both "for the new day and for the morrow" (pp. 318-19). The other is the Formal
Style: "[Tlhe rules of law are to decide the cases; policy is for the legislature . . . .Opinions
run in deductive form . . . ." (p. 321).
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replaced, and how legislation and case law interact."0
These lessons are continued in Part III, which focuses on warranty liability to third parties (pp. 555-731). Although the principal cases are mostly from New York," the courts cite cases from
other jurisdictions more frequently than in the previous section."
Again, cases and statutes interplay, first the Uniform Sales Act
and the Sale of Goods Act,' and then the Uniform Commercial
Code (pp. 717-28). Part III also illustrates the interaction between
tort law and contract law.
Part IV returns to a relatively narrow problem from one jurisdiction: the treatment of foreign remittances by New York courts
(pp. 733-827). The first cases were decided before World War I.
Most involve a statute designed to protect immigrants who were
sending money back home. 4 The last case concerns a multinational corporation whose efforts to send money to several of its
branches through an international bank were frustrated by the
5
outbreak of World War II.1

The courts in these cases had difficulty finding a conceptual
system that matched the facts with which they were working. Nor
were the courts able to understand the commercial needs of banks
engaged in international exchange transactions. The cases in Part
IV demonstrate how the courts learned to deal with these transactions. The authors supply this sequence without notes, questions,
or textual materials until all of the cases have been presented. Part
IV concludes with Karl Llewellyn's discussion of foreign remittances from The Common Law Tradition (pp. 804-11), and a proposed draft, that was never adopted, of a Uniform Commercial
Code section concerning foreign remittances (pp. 814-27).
10. Previously there is reference to the Code treatment of anticipatory repudiation (pp.
396-99).
11. The only exception is Geddling v. Marsh, [19201 1 K.B. 668 (p. 616).
12. For example, in the final decision reported, Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173
N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961), Chief Judge Desmond cites a sample bibliography of
law review articles, mentions that 20 states have abolished the privity requirement, and
quotes the U.C.C. (not then enacted in New York) (pp. 695-96).
13. The Uniform Sales Act and, to a lesser extent, the Sales of Goods Act are discussed
in Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117 (1943),
reprinted in part at pp. 649-64.
14. The first case in this sequence, Cutler v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 113 N.Y. 593,
21 N.E. 710 (1889) (p. 737), was decided prior to the enactment of the statute and was based
on common law. The statute is discussed in some of the cases and by Llewellyn in The
Common Law Tradition (pp. 804-11).
15. Kerr S.S. Co. v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, 292 N.Y. 253, 54
N.E.2d 813 (1944) (p. 787).
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Although the foreign remittance sequence concerns a narrow
issue, the students will unquestionably find these cases to be the
most difficult. Not only will they have difficulty understanding the
facts, but they are also unacquainted with the relevant bodies of
law, particularly negotiable instruments. On the other hand, they
will receive help from Llewellyn's comments and the proposed
Code section. This final part of the course, by requiring the student to demonstrate an understanding of the analytic techniques
developed by the preceding parts of the casebook, will distinguish
the outstanding students.
The authors intend American Law to improve the student's
ability to handle legal materials, to give him a glimmering of what
law is about, and, in the process, to help him become a lawyer.
They have carefully crafted this book to accomplish these goals.
The questions and cross-references constantly develop and build
on basic concepts. 16 The rigorous and subtle editing serves to focus
the student's attention on the relevant subject matter. An example
of this is the material on the forms of action; the authors include
only enough to enable the students to understand the particular
cases they will be studying. Many fascinating but time-consuming
archaisms are pruned. Thus, while detinue is discussed fully (pp.
27, 30-36), wager of law receives only passing mention (pp. 30-31),
and the development of special and general assumpsit is omitted
completely.
The authors have carefully integrated the book's textual selections. In the remedies discussion, for example, the authors quote
Blackstone (pp. 3-7, 24-32), Langdell (pp. 8-12), and Corbin (discussing Hohfeld) (pp. 12-24). The writings of these scholars are
clearly an integral part of the legal world into which the student is
entering. Through reading their works, the student is impressed
with the importance of the legal tradition. Simultaneously, by applying the ideas set forth in the writings to the cases that follow,
the student enters that tradition.
At first glance, the book looks like a great plum pudding
stuffed with miscellaneous, albeit interesting, material. On closer
examination, however, each part becomes related to the whole. The
material should enable a student to learn what the authors intend
16. Each major sequence of cases ends with a question or group of questions that brings
all of the materials together. For example, in Part II students are asked, "What precedent
techniques does Cardozo employ in his discussions of [three named cases]?" (p. 518). Students are also asked to argue several of the earlier cases as if they had come up after the
final case in the sequence (pp. 518-19).
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him to learn. But will he?
It is impossible to give a definite answer. There are several
possibilities. In the worst case, a resentful, mediocre student is
forced to take the course from a resentful, mediocre teacher, who is
forced to teach it. If this student is concerned about his grade,
then assuming the teacher is fairly conscientious, gives an examination that in some way relates to the course, and grades it fairly
strictly, the course will provide substantial benefits. One is that the
student will learn about remedies in the first two to four weeks of
law school. Law schools frequently skimp on instruction in this
area. A knowledge of remedies will enable the student to understand his other courses better.
The student will also be forced to realize that a legal system is,
among other things, a system for settling disputes. It is not just a
group of abstractions. The system is one in which people get or
suffer revenge, go to jail, pay money, and get divorced. Everyone
involved in the system must be aware of this. Judges sign their
names to judgments. Lawyers collect money from clients because
they have done something for them. Frequently, legislators take
action because someone seeks a gain for himself. This process cannot be separated from the concept or rule. Yet many students ignore the actual operation of the system in their eagerness to learn
the "law" in terms of rules. But until they become aware of the
dynamics of the system, they will not have learned the "law."
What happens if the plaintiff wins is very basic information. Part I
is thus very much a study of the law in action; it emphasizes the
fact that rules of law are part of a system in which things happen
to people.
The worst-case student will also become familiar with the
techniques of legal analysis. The text, by describing what a brief
should contain (pp. xxviii-xxxv), and by following the cases with
questions that focus the student's attention on the precise holding,
will help this student to acquire skills in briefing cases. Furthermore, the course will force the student to consider the social context in which the courts decide cases. Even the worst-case student
will learn something about the development and application of legal doctrine as something separate from any single field of law.
The questions and the supplementary text material in the book,
together with the supplementary readings in Llewellyn and Levi,
emphasize this analysis. The worst-case student will have at least
considered how a lawyer's argument can influence a case and perhaps will acquire a sense of how a lawyer works.
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In the best case - the good, willing student who has a knowledgeable enthusiastic teacher - the results will be substantially
greater. Such a student will not only acquire a sense of what it
means to be a lawyer, but should also, to a considerable degree,
become one. This is clearly the authors' intention.
American Law makes a significant contribution to both American legal education and American law. It is a reaffirmation of the
standard position about the purpose and nature of an American
law school: a professional school at the graduate level that is firmly
attached to a university. Thus, the law school is a compromise between an institution devoted to technical training-a trade
school-and one that is primarily scholarly. It has always been difficult to maintain the balance between the two norms, and there
are always movements to push law schools in one direction or the
other. The origins of American Law were in Llewellyn's lectures at
Columbia University. These lectures were given at a time when Columbia had just thwarted an effort to change it from a law school
primarily designed to train lawyers into an institution devoted primarily to scholarship and research.17 American Law is being published in a period when there is great pressure to have almost the
entire time in law school devoted to skills-training, rather than
scholarship in the traditional sense.
It is very difficult to describe the discipline of law in the
United States. Law schools do not train students to become scholars, though law schools are located within universities and all of
their students are graduate students. On the other hand, American
law schools are certainly not equivalent to trade schools. Students
are not taught entirely by practical training. Perhaps one could say
that the discipline assumes that the practice of law requires instruction in law as an intellectual discipline or exercise, even
though the purpose of the school is to produce lawyers not scholars. Indeed, the students are to become lawyers in the course of
three years. During this time, students acquire a lawyer's vocabulary and habits of thought, and gain some understanding of the
underlying structure and organization of the legal system. The theory is that they will acquire the technical details after they finish
law school, and that a mastery of the details without the professional training does not make one a lawyer. The aim in other fields
is similar. Graduation from a military academy, for example, is in17. The literature on the Columbia University struggle is considerable. Perhaps the
most accessible treatment is in W. TWINING, supra note 1, at 41-69.
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tended to mean that one is an officer. Mastery of gunnery or the
experience of commanding men in simulated field exercises does
not make one an officer. These activities, however, are part of the
training and may contribute to achieving the goal. It is a matter of
acquiring the attitudes and habits of mind of a member of a
profession.
To this extent, there is nothing particularly radical or different about Llewellyn's approach as set out and continued in American Law. This approachreflects the implicit philosophy of most
persons in legal education. Llewellyn departs from the general view
by adding a dimension to the principal skills that are avowedly
taught in law school, and indicating why the methods that law
schools use are effective in training lawyers. He does this in part by
redefining the concept of a lawyer.
The heart of Llewellyn's view of law is expressed in the following quotation from Levin Goldschmidt, a nineteenth-century German commercial-law scholar. Llewellyn gave much prominence to
this passage in The Common Law Tradition, and it is quoted in
American Law (p. 342 n.f):
Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can
take it in, carries within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its
right law. This is a natural law which is real, not imaginary; it is
not a creature of mere reason, but rests on the solid foundation
of what reason can recognize in the nature of man and of the life
conditions of the time and place; it is thus not eternal nor
changeless nor everywhere the same, but is indwelling in the
very circumstances of life. The highest task of law-giving consists in uncovering and implementing this immanent law.18
In the United States, the judge, or more accurately the legal system, may achieve this result only by an artful use of the formal
legal sources in conjunction with a sense of the facts. The good
judge will try to reach a solution, which in its expression and result, will achieve the goal that Goldschmidt and Llewellyn described. A good advocate or draftsman will be aware that this is
what the judge wants to accomplish, and will frame his argument
or draw his contract accordingly.
One acquires this skill through practice-hence, American
Law. By analyzing what the judges did, what they said they did,
18. L. GOLDSCHMIDT, Preface to Kritik des Entwurfs eines Handelsgesetzbuchs, Krit.
Zeitschr. f.d. ges. Rechtswissenschaft, Vol 4, No. 4, quoted in K. LLEWgLLYN, supra note 9,
at 122.
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how they could have done better, what the consequences that followed were, and why it mattered, the student sees what it means to
be involved with law, to be a lawyer. And as one sees it, one becomes it.
The aim of American Law is to create a professional, a craftsman. Someone who, consciously or unconsciously, knows what the
law must accomplish, what a lawyer's jobs are, and how to do
them. There are many ways of obtaining this result. One may instill pride in the profession by drilling the student on technical
matters such as citation form. This is the legal equivalent of closeorder drill. Later in law school, the student may make arguments
or write briefs and memoranda. But the central object for study is
the case, especially the appellate case. In the judicial opinion, one
sees a real mind struggling with a real problem. As the student
empathizes with the judge's struggle, he joins the judge's profession. He can accomplish this only if he understands what the judge
is really doing. If he thinks it is all just logic-chopping, not much is
accomplished. It is an extremely tough intellectual exercise, but it
has an emotional aspect because real people are involved.
In some ways, this is a very oriental approach. The Japanese
gardener may look at a mass of trees and shrubbery for hours
before he trims even one twig. Obviously, he has to know how to
cut, and how to cut so that the branch will grow properly. But the
basic skill is knowing in a very deep way what a Japanese garden is
supposed to be, having a feel for it. Another example would be a
Chinese official, whose traditional education instilled an understanding of men and government. He acquired this understanding
primarily by studying how the Duke of Chou and similar worthies
handled problems in the fifth century B.C. and before. He would
then not find it difficult to cope with floods, bandits, and lazy
monarchs.
Ours is a government of men, not of laws-though the two are
not separate. To put it another way, the law is "not written in tables of stone but in fleshy tables of the heart."'19 There are no abstract rules that men must follow. Law is not a passive body of
doctrine. It is the activity of men performing law-jobs. If one has
the vision, one will do the job well. If one does not have it, one will
not.
It is particularly important to induce this sense of craft or profession once one has formally abandoned the traditional belief in
19. 2 CORINTHIANS 3:3.
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law as immanent and invariable rules that are waiting to be discovered. Absent fixed rules, the judge could be free to decide as he
wishes, according to whim, caprice, or prejudice, and then pretend
the reason is his predecessor's decision. This is clearly a danger of
which Llewellyn was very conscious. He believed, however, that a
judge has a sense of craft or professionalism that enables him to
perceive society's needs and requires him to act accordingly. A lawyer will do a better job if he and all lawyers are very clear about
what is happening to man and society."0
This is really what legal ethics is all about. Matters such as
conflicts of interest and accounting for clients' funds are only details; a sense of professionalism is the basis of an ethical practice.
One who has this sense will usually know and do what is right,
although, of course, he must still learn the rules. Without this
sense, a knowledge of rules will not be of much help.
I assume that the authors of American Law would agree that
their book, or The Bramble Bush, or even a course in Elements is
not essential to acquiring a sense of professionalism. Giving students this sense is what American law schools have been doing, at
least when they are successful. This book should, however, make
the job a little easier. It should make even the best students understand better and make the worst students understand at least a
little. The authors apparently feel that by understanding the goals
and fighting through the cases in Llewellyn's way, the students will
receive a deeper experience of the law.
They make a very strong case. This is a very difficult book
both to teach and to study. The authors are publishing a teacher's
manual; it will be used. I believe the teacher should also read Karl
Llewellyn and the Realist Movement,21 The Common Law Tradition,2 and The Cheyenne Way.23 If both teacher and student work
at it, they will come face-to-face with the heart of our legal system
as one of its most astute observers saw it.
Is this what law schools should be doing? Everyone is weary of
rhetoric. For every statement about the nobility of the profession,
there is a plethora of information about its greed, incompetence,
20. This could be said to be the message of The Common Law Tradition taken as a
whole. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 9, at 3-6, 19-20, 23-24, 45-50.
21. W. TWINING, supra note 1.
22. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 9.
23. K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941). Thisbook seems to be a
key work in understanding Llewellyn's views. Observing a group like the Cheyenne Indians
enabled Llewellyn to consider law in a context completely separate from the formal conceptual traditions of European law.
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and dreariness. Like it or not, however, lawyers will be involved in
almost any social struggle because most of those struggles become
lawsuits. We, therefore, should want at least a few lawyers to have
caught fire-to be passionate lawyers. Llewellyn was one, and he
did not get that way by following the obvious route of participating
in famous cases. He caught fire from the sparks set by his struggles
with the ideas he found in cases on commercial letters of credit,
negotiable instruments, foreign remittances, and similar matters. It
was an intense intellectual experience, but it also produced emotional results. His own fire was never quenched, and he thought
that others having the same experience would achieve the same
result.
Whether American Law will succeed in lighting any fires in
those who use it is hard to predict. Nor is it even certain that the
enthusiasm or passion for the law that Llewellyn preached is of
much value or importance. There is no question, however, that he
believed it was.2 4 He believed completely in the common-law tradition. He wrote poetry about it.25 He also dedicated his last book to
"the undying succession of the Great Commercial Judges whose
work across the centuries has given living body, toughness and in' Few
spiration to the Grand Tradition of the Common Law." 26
branches of the law are less interesting to most lawyers and law
students than commercial law. Yet the ability of those judges to
wrestle with its arid concepts inspired Llewellyn's very emotional
final plea to the profession.
Llewellyn began his line of judges with Holt (1642-1710).
While he probably should have gone back to Coke (1551-1634),
Llewellyn was doubtful about Coke's abilities as a judge. 2 Further24. See his interesting appeal for teaching this approach to the law in a dedicatory
address at the University of Chicago Law School (pp. 272-92). One of the obstacles, he
wrote, was "the tradition of the ordinary modern American intellectual: he feels shy about
open expression of the things which most deeply move him, those by which he lives; and he
commonly distrusts the value of more preachment, anyhow, to change the heart or stir the
soul" (p. 290). But he felt it to be necessary:
It is of the essence in any aspect, it is trebly of the essence of the profession as a
liberal art. It represents that line and variety of obligation without which all the

rest becomes a menace. And much of the job depends so largely on knowledge
and on vision that neither the needed insight nor the needed informed responsibility comes, to any but the more gifted, by mere exposure and osmosis.
(p. 290).
25. See K.

LLEWELLYN,

A Come-AU-Ye for Lawyers, The Common Law Tradition, in

THE COMMON LAW TRADIION 399-400 (1960)
26. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 9, at v.

27. Id. at 223.

(printed with music).
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more, in commercial law, Coke is noted for impeding the development of a separate commercial jurisdiction in England.2 8 Nevertheless, there is that great set-piece of common-law history, the Case
of Commendams,29 of which Llewellyn would surely have approved. There, judges had signed a letter to the King, protesting
his interference in a lawsuit. In response, they were summoned to
court and castigated for interfering with the royal prerogative.
"[AIll the Judges fell down upon their knees, and acknowledged
their error for matter of form, humbly craving his Majesty's gracious favour and pardon for the same."30 Coke, however, reaffirmed
the substance of their position. Then Sir Francis Bacon, who was
Chancellor, said that they were wrong on the law, and, in effect,
asked them to recant. They all did, "the Lord Chief Justice [Coke]
only except."3 1 Coke "said for answer, that when that case should
be, he would do that should be fit for a Judge to do."3 " It took
courage to say no. He gave up his enormously successful career in
the law and eventually went to prison for the sake of the law itself.
A modern commentator wrote that Coke,
with a mind fanatically narrow, was possessed with a profound
veneration for the law as it stood-for its technicalities as well
as its substance-and he was convinced that it was not by
change and reform but by the following of precedents that the
liberties of England were to be defended. 8
Bacon, Coke's opponent in this and many other matters, was one
of the great minds of Western Eurpoe. He is a central figure in any
history of western thought. Yet, Anglo-American liberties, such as
they are, owe little if anything to Bacon. They owe a lot to Coke.
Karl Llewellyn, who was anything but narrow, was a reformer.
But he also believed passionately in following the precedents of the
common law-albeit in his own way. The Theory and Craft of
American Law describes that way and shows how to follow it by
the case method. American law schools could do worse than to use
it.

28. See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 491-92 (3d ed. 1945).
29. 5 F. BACON, The Letters and the Life, in 12 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 354-71 (J.
Spedding ed. 1869).
30. Id. at 365.
31. Id. at 367.
32. Id.
33. J. TANNER, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE REIGN OF JAMES I, at 176 (1930).

